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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION OF 
SECTION 18 OF THE FRANCHISE AGREEMENT. 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING PAROL 
EVIDENCE AND IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL EVIDENCE FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF CONSTRUING SECTION 18. 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE 
INTRODUCTION OF PAROL EVIDENCE AND EXPERT TESTIMONY 
ON THE MEANING AND INTENT OF SECTION 18 OF THE 
FRANCHISE AGREEMENT. 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE 
APPELLANT WOULD BE UNJUSTLY ENRICHED IF NOT REQUIRED 
TO JOIN THE TEN STATE AREA ADVERTISING TRUST EVEN 
THOUGH THE RESPONDENT DID NOT PLEAD OR PROVE A CLAIM 
OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
WHETHER ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED THE 
APPELLANT IF HE SUCCEEDS ON APPEAL AS THE "PREVAILING 
PARTY." 
WHETHER THE APPELLANT OR RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AS THE PREVAILING PARTY. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered in favor 
of the Respondent for an alleged breach of franchise 
agreement involving whether or not the Appellant is 
obligated to join an advertising co-op known as the Ten 
State Area Advertising Trust and pay 2% of his gross 
profits to such entity* 
The Respondent's complaint alleged the Appellant had 
breached a franchise agreement by refusing to pay a 
percentage of gross profits and by failing to provide 
detailed financial statements each month. (R.l). The 
Respondent sought monetary relief and attorney's fees. 
At trial the Respondent conceded that the detailed 
financial statements were insignificant and the central 
issue was whether the Appellant was required to join the 
advertising co-op and to pay a percentage of gross income. 
The trial court permitted the introduction of parol 
evidence over Appellant's objection and ruled in favor of 
the Respondent by entering a declaratory judgment 
obligating the Appellant to join the Ten State Area 
Advertising Trust and ordering the payment of 2% of 
Appellant's gross sales per month, by granting a judgment 
in favor of the Respondent representing 2% of gross sales 
for the period of April 8, 1983 through December 31, 1985, 
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by determining the Appellant had breached the franchise 
agreement for failing to provide monthly financial 
statements and awarding $1.00 nominal damage, and by 
awarding the Respondent $2,800.00 in attorney's fees as 
the prevailing party. 
There is no challenge on appeal to the trial court's 
finding that the Appellant had failed to provide monthly 
financial statements or the $1.00 nominal award. There is 
no issue that the Appellant is current on all royalty 
payments due. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant is the operator of a "Home Town Taco Time" 
fast food restaurant located in Green River, Emery County, 
Utah. Green River is a town of approximately 1,200 
inhabitants and is located in southeastern Utah 
approximately 186 miles from Salt Lake City and 106 miles 
from Grand Junction, Colorado. (T. 615). The Appellant 
and the Respondent entered into the Home Town Taco Time 
Franchise Agreement on May 4, 1977. (Ex. 5-P). The 
Appellant paid $16,000.00 as an initial deposit and agreed 
to pay 3i% royalty fees per month. (T.634 and Ex. 29 D). 
Prior to signing the Franchise Agreement, the Respondent 
led Appellant to believe that the deposit and royalty was 
going to be used, in part, for uniform advertising (T. 
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636). No one told the Appellant that he would be required 
to join any advertising co-op or pay any further fees. 
(T.637). 
The Franchise Agreement contains the following 
significant language: 
* * * * 
RECITALS 
"A. Taco Time International, Inc., an Oregon 
Corporation, (The Company) has over a period of time 
and at considerable expense developed an established 
and uniform and unique method of operation, customer 
service, advertising, publicity, processes, 
techniques and technical knowledge in connection with 
the restaurant business, the outlets for which are 
known as and named 'Taco Time1." 
* * * * 
"1. Franchise. CFI hereby grants, sells, and 
conveys to the Operator the exclusive right to 
utilize the above-mentioned methods and system, 
together with the use of available Company 
trademarks, tradenames, techniques, advertising, 
processes, receipts and designs ... ." 
* * * * 
"18. Advertising. At all times the Operator 
will conduct the business which is the subject of 
this franchise under the name 'TACO TIME' and will 
advertise his 'TACO TIME' restaurant and its services 
on a scale consistent with the volume of his business 
and in keeping with practical business practices. In 
so advertising, the Operator will utilize all 
advertising formats, formulas, and programs furnished 
to the Operator by CFI. It is understood that CFI 
may desire to cause Operators in a given area to join 
into a uniform program of promoting given products or 
services either through sales, discounts, specials or 
other promotional devices. The Operator will 
participate in any such procedures upon the request 
of CFI." 
-4-
* * * * 
"32. Litigation Expense. In the event that an 
action at law or suit in equity is brought to 
establish, obtain or enforce any right by either of 
the parties to this agreement, the prevailing party 
in such suit or action, both in the trial and 
appellate courts, shall be entitled to a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be recovered from the other party 
as well as that party's costs and disbursements 
incurred in such suit or action." 
* * * * 
"35. Entire Agreement. This agreement 
constitutes the entire agreement of the parties (into 
which all prior negotiations, commitments, 
representations, and undertakings with respect to the 
subject matter hereof are merged) and there are no 
oral or other written understandings or agreements 
between the parties hereto relating to the subject 
matter hereof." (All emphases added). 
* * * * 
The Respondent did not produce any witnesses concerning 
the negotiations which led to the Franchise Agreement. 
However, it admitted through its President Ed Craig that 
the Franchise Agreement was a form agreement prepared by 
Taco Time International and furnished to the Respondent 
(T. 406), admitted the Respondent had never interpreted 
Section 18 regarding advertising (T. 451), admitted 
Section 18 was silent concerning the obligation to join a 
separate entity or to pay 2% for advertising (T. 452-453), 
and admitted the Respondent has never requested that the 
Appellant himself advertise (T. 454-10). 
No issues arose under the Franchise Agreement from 
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1977 until February 9f 1979. At that time the Respondent 
wrote and asked the Appellant to join in a new Taco Time 
Advertising Trust. A separate agreement was enclosed 
which called for the Appellant to pay 1/2 of 1% of gross 
into the Trust. (Ex. 7-P). The Appellant refused. (T. 
421). The Respondent wrote again on June 26, 1979, (Ex. 
9-P) and requested againf and again the Appellant refused 
to participate. 
In June 1981, a new and separate non-profit Utah 
advertising trust known as the Ten State Area Advertising 
Association/ Inc. (herein "Trust") was created for the 
purpose of advertising on behalf of its Taco Time members. 
(T. 425, Ex. 39 D). Eligibility for membership is limited 
to those who enter into a separate written subscription 
agreement between the Trust, the Respondent, and an 
operator which calls for the operator to pay 2% of gross 
sales into the trust. (Exh. 37 D). This subscription 
agreement also states in Paragraph 7 that, in order for 
the agreement to be effective, at least 75% of the 
franchised operators must agree to be solicited and join 
the Trust. 
The Respondent admits there is no connection between 
it and the Trust, that the Trust is a separate entity, 
that the Respondent does not control the Trust, and that 
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the Trust was not even contemplated in 1977. (T. 436-437, 
testimony of Ed Craigf President). The Respondent 
admitted, almost astonishingly that although it had not 
been damaged by the Appellants refusal to join the 
advertising co-op, it was seeking damages on which the 
Respondent believed was due the Trust. (T. 449). Although 
the Respondent claims in this action the advertising 
program was compulsory and not voluntary (T. 427), it 
admitted that the advertising program was described as a 
"voluntary contractual agreement" to all its operators in 
correspondence to its operators dated November 23, 1981 
(Exh. 14-P). The Respondent's President, Ed Craig, 
further admitted on cross that participation in the Trust 
was voluntary. (T. 456, 458). 
No additional action on this issue occurred until 
March 23, 1983. At this time the Respondent sent 
Appellant a letter demanding the Appellant join the Trust. 
(Exh. 19-P). The Appellant did not respond and the 
present action was filed on February 4, 1984 (R. 1). The 
Respondent alleged in its complaint that the Appellant had 
failed to participate in the advertising program of the 
Trust and had failed to pay a percentage due the trust. 
The Complaint sought damages and attorney's fees. The 
Respondent did not set forth any causes of action for 
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unjust enrichment or for declaratory relief. 
At trial the Defendant offered and the Court received 
evidence dehors the Franchise Agreement over the 
Appellant's objections concerning parol evidence and 
relevancy and materiality. For example, the Court 
received Exhibits 1-P (T. 395), 2-P (T. 395) 27-P (T. 
402), and 3-P (T. 404) over such objections; and, it 
received expert testimony relative to what the industry 
standards are now over such objections and over further 
foundational objections. (T. 416, 417, 473, 501, 668, 791 
and others). The Appellant further objected, without 
success, to testimony relative to unjust enrichment (T. 
713), to testimony relative to what other operators do and 
pay (T. 668), and to testimony relative to the 
Respondent's alleged damages due to its failure to respond 
to discovery requests (T. 537). 
At trial, Dan Jones, Secretary Treasurer, Director, 
and House Counsel of Respondent testified that the 
Franchise Agreement did not require the Appellant to pay 
2% of gross receipts for advertising. (T. 556). He 
testified that the Appellant had an obligation to 
advertise on a scale consistent with volume and practical 
business practices but not to pay any sums to the Trust. 
(T. 557). He testified the Appellant had not refused to 
-8-
join the Trust only to pay 2% of gross receipts (T. 
559). 
The Appellant produced expert evidence through Gerald 
Shupef P.A., that the Appellant advertised on a scale 
consistent with the volume of his business and in keeping 
with sound business practices. (T. 581). Mr. Shupe was 
the Appellant's accountant for over 20 years and was 
familiar with small businesses in Southeastern Utah. (T. 
578). Mr. Shupe testified that the Appellant's level of 
advertising was consistent with other proprietor's 
generally in Southeastern Utah (T. 580). 
Naomi Dumasf proprietor of the "Chow Hound" and chief 
competitor of the Appellant testified that she was aware 
of the Appellant's advertising expenditures and they were 
not inconsistent with hers. (T. 621-623). She believed 
she advertised according to sound business practices for 
such businesses in Southeastern Utah and so did the 
Appellant. (T. 623). 
The Appellant and his wife, Arlene Weihing, both 
testified that the methods and means of advertising in 
Southeastern Utah were sparse. Radio and T.V. and other 
electronic media advertising were impractical. (T. 642 to 
644 and T. 701 to 705). The Appellant advertised in local 
newspapers (T. 701), high school yearbooks, etc. (T. 701). 
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Also, discounts, door prizes, free products, etc., were 
utilized. (T. 704). The Respondent's own expert agreed 
that electronic media advertising would be impractical for 
the Appellant. (T. 485), 487). Such expert further 
admitted that the Appellant was doing all practical 
advertising now except, perhaps, joining an advertising 
co-op or, possibly, erecting a billboard. (T. 488). 
Following the trial, the Court entered a Memorandum 
Decision (R. 354). The Court considered the Appellant's 
obligation to join the Trust at Paragraph 5: 
"... The Court considers the Plaintiff 
does have the authority under the contracts 
here in question, and has construed, in light 
of the general business climate and industry 
here involved, to empower the Plaintiff to 
require that the Defendant utilize the 
advertising program submitted to it ... ." 
The Court further held that the Appellant was required to 
pay 2% of his gross receipts to the Respondent from 15 
days past March 23, 1983, to the present. The Court's 
rationale is otherwise found in Paragraph 16 of its 
Memorandum Decision, and is underscored by concepts of the 
Respondent's expense in creating a favorable image and the 
Appellant's unjust enrichment by not being required to 
contribute. The Court found that the Appellant's 
advertising was "good will" and would not allow a credit 
against the Respondent's damages. (Ibid). The Court 
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entered a Declaratory Judgment ordering the Appellant to 
join the Trust, ordering the Defendant to pay 2% of his 
gross receipts to the Trust, granting a judgment to the 
Respondent for unpaid 2% monthly amounts apparently found 
due the Trust, and awarding attorney's fees to the 
Respondent as the "prevailing party." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Appellant respectfully submits that Section 18 of 
the Franchise Agreement is clear and unambiguous. It is 
not susceptible to a construction mandating the 
Appellant's participation in an advertising co-op and the 
payment of 2% of the Appellant's gross profits to such 
co-op. The Trial Court erred in its construction of 
Section 18 and wrongfully permitted parol and extrensic 
evidence on the issue. The Trial Court improperly 
concluded that the Appellant may be forced to join the 
advertising co-op on the principle of unjust enrichment 
and the Court erred in awarding the Respondent monetary 
damages where no damages were demonstrated. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION OF 
SECTION 18 OF THE FRANCHISE AGREEMENT. 
The Appellant contends that Section 18 is clear and 
unambiguous. Section 18 does not require the Appellant to 
join any advertising co-op or to pay 2% of the Appellant's 
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gross receipts to such entity: 
"18. Advertising. At all times the Operator 
will conduct the business which is the subject of 
this franchise under the name 'TACO TIME1 and will 
advertise his fTACO TIME1 restaurant and its services 
on a scale consistent with the volume of his business 
and in keeping with practical business practices. In 
so advertising, the Operator will utilize all 
advertising formats, formulas, and programs furnished 
to the Operator by CFI. It is understood that CFI 
may desire to cause Operators in a given area to join 
into a uniform program of promoting given products or 
services either through sales, discounts, specials or 
other promotional devices. The Operator will 
participate in any such procedures upon the request 
of CFI." (Emphasis added). 
Several observations may be made concerning the language. 
First, the Appellant's obligation to advertise arises 
solely out of the first and second sentences. The 
obligation is one imposed upon the Appellant and requires 
him to advertise on a scale consistent with his business 
and in keeping with practical business practices. The 
Trial Court did not find the Appellant breached this 
obligation. Indeed it could not. The testimony was 
conclusive that the Appellant was advertising consistent 
with practical business practices under the circumstances 
— with the exception that joining an advertising co-op 
might be an option which, if required, may be beneficial. 
Second, the Appellant's obligation is to utilize all 
advertising formats, formulas, and programs "furnished to 
the Operator by CFI." The evidence was conclusive that 
the Appellant utilized all advertising furnished to him by 
CFI. The trial court did not find the Appellant breached 
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this obligation. 
Thirdf regarding the Appellant's obligation to join 
programs as described in the last two sentences of Section 
18, the language is specific and restrictive. The initial 
restriction concerns its application: it applies to 
"operators in a given area." A "given area" cannot be 
construed, as the trial court must have concluded, to be 
the entire ten states in which the Respondent operates. 
The next restriction concerns the operators duty: the 
operator must "promotfe] given products or services." 
This must certainly mean the Appellant must promote 
"specific" products or services as opposed to paying a 
percentage of gross sales. The last restriction in these 
two sentences refers to the method or manner that the 
operator must promote: he must do so through "sales, 
discounts, specials, or other promotional devices." This 
language cannot possibly be construed to mean an operator 
must join a trust and pay a percentage of his sales. 
The plain unambiguous language sets forth the 
Appellant's contractual obligations. These contractual 
obligations were not breached by the Appellant. It is 
impossible to read into the language contained in Section 
18 any obligation of the Appellant to join a separate 
entity and pay 2% of his gross proceeds. 
The evidence also supports the view that there is no 
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obligation under Section 18 for the Appellant to join the 
Trust, The unrebutted testimony of the Appellant was that 
he was told by the Respondent the Appellants $16,000 
deposit and his 3i% royalty would be usedf in partf for 
advertising* Section 1 of the Franchise Agreement 
supports this proposition. Also, the Respondent invited 
the Appellant to participate in different advertising 
co-op in 1979. (Ex. 7-P). The invitation contained a 
separate agreement which did in fact have provisions for 
joining as a member and paying a percentage of gross 
profits. In addition, within six months after the 
formation of the Ten States Area Advertising Association, 
Inc. Trust, Mr. Ed Craig, President, wrote and told all 
operators that the advertising program was a "voluntary 
contractual agreement." (Ex. 14-P, T 456, 458). 
Moreover, the advertising trust was not even contemplated 
in 1977 when the Franchise Agreement was signed. (T. 
436-437). Furthermore, the advertising trust would have 
ceased to exist by its own terms had not 75% of the 
operators voluntarily joined by separate written 
subscription agreements. (Ex. 37 D). Lastly, the 
evidence showed that the language in Section 18 in later 
generations of franchise agreements does call for a 
mandatory membership in the Trust as well as for a 
percentage fee. (Exh. 40-D, 41-D, 42-D, 43-D and T. 443-8 
to 23). 
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The Appellant respectfully submits the Trial Court 
erred in its construction of Section 18 of the Franchise 
Agreement* 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING PAROL EVIDENCE 
AND IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL EVIDENCE FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF CONSTRUING SECTION 18. 
The Trial Court permitted the following evidence to 
be admitted over the Appellant's objections: 
Evidence Description Objection 
1-P Franchise Deposit Receipt 395 
2-P Pro-Forma Assumptions 399 
27-P Worksheet for Pro-Forma 402 
3-P Pro-Forma for Appellant 403 
4-P Appellant's Financial Statement 405 
Testimony Ed Craig, on subject of competitor's 
advertising standards 416 
Testimony Gordon Jacox, as expert on subject 
of industry standards 473 
Testimony Gordon Jacox, as expert, on his 
interpretation of Franchise 
Agreement 493 
Testimony Marcia Walke, as Director of Trust, 
on subject of industry standards 501 
Testimony Dan Jones, as attorney for Respon-
dent on subject of industry 
standards 541 
Other citations could be provided; however, the above is 
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demonstrative of the Appellant's consistent objection to 
parol evidence, irrelevant and immaterial evidencef and 
opinion evidence adduced without proper foundation. 
The Trial Court did in fact rely on such evidence in 
rendering its decision. In Paragraphs 5 and 6 of its 
Memorandum Decision (R. 356) and in Paragraphs 12 and 13 
of its Findings (R. 371), the Court construed the 
Franchise Agreement "in light of the general business 
climate and industry here involved." (Id.). 
In this case, the Franchise Agreement was an 
"integrated" contract. Article 35 provides: 
"35. Entire Agreement. This agreement 
constitutes the entire agreement of the parties (into 
which all prior negotiations, commitments, 
representations, and undertakings with respect to the 
subject matter hereof are merged) and there are no 
oral or other written understandings or agreements 
between the parties hereto relating to the subject 
matter hereof." 
Objections based upon the parol evidence rule, rules 
governing relevancy and materiality, and foundation should 
have been sustained. 
As a general rule, in the absence of fraud, an 
apparently complete and certain agreement which the 
parties have reduced to writing should be conclusively 
presumed to contain the whole argument; and that parol 
evidence of whatever type should not be received for the 
purpose of varying or adding to the terms of the written 
agreement. Erie v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d. 
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1190 (Utah 1981) (cases cited therein). 
In Appellant's view Section 18 is clear and 
unambiguous. Even if an ambiguity existed, such ambiguity 
should have been construed against the Respondent because 
it was the party who chose the terminology and drafted the 
form agreement. Bryant v. Deseret News Pub. Co., 233 
P.2d. 355 (Utah 1951). 
The Appellant also claims that evidence pertaining to 
competitors standards, "industry" standards, or "general 
business climate," should also be rejected because of 
relevancy and materiality rules as well. As a general 
rule the construction of contracts is a legal question and 
expert testimony such as Mr. Jacox's is not germane. 
North Point Consol, Irrigation Co. v. Utah & S.L. Canal 
Co., 16 U 246, 52 P. 168; Idaho Forwarding Co. v. 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 8 U. 41, 29 P. 826; 31 Am.Jur.2d. 
Experts § 69. 
Further, what other competitors do in respect to 
advertising or what other standards exist in the industry 
is irrelevant and immaterial. Only the clear and 
unambiguous terms of the contract are material and 
relevant. The Appellant signed a contract in 1977 and no 
one told him that he would be bound to any industry 
standards or "general business climate." No one told him 
he was contractually bound to perform whatever obligations 
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are found generally to exist in the fast food industry. 
There was no testimony concerning what the standards 
were in 1977. There is no evidence concerning what the 
general business climate was in 1977. Foundational 
objections were properly lodged. Even assuming there was 
testimony or evidence relating to 1977, there is no 
connection showing the Appellant was aware of them or 
agreed to be bound by them. 
Under the facts of this case, there is no allegation 
or finding that the contract is ambiguous. There is no 
allegation or finding of fraud. There is no request for a 
declaratory judgment concerning what the contract means. 
The language is clear and susceptible to no other meaning 
than the plain and ordinary meaning the words convey. The 
Appellant's objections to the extraneous evidence, dehors 
the contract, should have been sustained. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE 
APPELLANT WOULD BE UNJUSTLY ENRICHED IF NOT REQUIRED 
TO JOIN THE ADVERTISING TRUST AND PAY THE PERCENTAGE 
FEE WHERE THE RESPONDENT DID NOT PLEAD OR PROVE A 
CLAIM OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
The Respondent did not plead a claim for unjust 
enrichment. (R. 1-17). Respondent did not prove such a 
claim or request his complaint be amended to include such 
a claim. Unjust enrichment was not mentioned in the 
Respondent's Opening Argument nor requested in closing. 
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The only time any reference was made to unjust enrichment, 
the Respondent promptly objected. (T. 713). 
Neverthelessf the Trial Court considered and found 
that the Appellant's failure to join the Ten State Area 
Advertising Association, Inc., advertising trust "would 
have the effect of unjust enrichment." Factually, the 
Trust has not historically advertised on behalf of the 
Appellant. (T. 520, 703). Furthermore, the only 
advertisement beneficial to the Appellant in Southeastern 
Utah pivots around only name recognition and trade-mark 
recognition which must certainly be part of Recital A and 
Paragraph 1 of the Franchise Agreement. What else could 
be found to be included within such provisions. 
Decrees regarding equity must have a basis in the 
pleadings and the evidence. 61 A Am.Jur.2d Pleadings 382. 
Notice pleading, of course, is nominally required -- but 
some sort of pleading and proof is mandatory. Such was 
not present here. A party's proof cannot materially vary 
from his allegations and the judgment must respond to the 
issues raised by the pleadings. Ibid. Utah has always 
recognized these generally referenced rules. In 
Stockyards Nat. Bank of South Omaha v. Bragg, et al, 245 
P.966 (Utah 1926), the Court held that a petition or 
pleading of "some kind" was the jurisdictional means of 
investing a court with power of subject matter to 
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adjudicate the matter. And, a judgment which is beyond or 
not supported by the pleadings must fail: 
"It is fundamental that a petition or pleading 
of some kind is the juridical means of investing a 
court with jurisdiction of subject matter to 
adjudicate it, and a judgment which is beyond or not 
supported by pleadings must fall." Id., at 973. 
Also see In re Evans, et al, 130 P. 217 (Utah 1913), and 
Cooke v. Cooke, 248 P. 83 (Utah 1926). ("These are 
immutable elements"). 
The Appellant contends that fundamental fairness 
requires his opposing party or the Court to verbalize the 
issues in advance of trial. The Appellant concedes that 
notice pleading may be sufficient; however, some pleading 
is essential. In this case, neither the Appellant nor the 
Respondent understood that unjust enrichment was involved 
in this litigation. 
The Respondent did not prove a claim of unjust 
enrichment requiring restitution at trial either. As 
cited by this court previously, "Unjust enrichment does 
not apply to every circumstance where one has been 
benefited by another's detriment." General Leasing Co. v. 
Manivest Corp., 667 P.2d 596 (Utah 1983). (Also see, 
cases cited therein). This case does not involve 
obtaining money or property under false pretenses. It 
does not involve a factual situation where property is 
provided upon request. Acquiescence in a direct benefit 
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has not occurred where a trier of fact can appropriately 
find an implied contract to pay its reasonable value. 
Here, the Appellant openly refused to join the Trust. The 
Trust did not advertise directly for the Appellant. This 
is not a case where benefits were conferred upon the 
Appellant under mistake and which equity requires a 
recompense. The benefits, if any, were officiously 
provided. 
The Appellant respectfully submits that the trial 
court erred in citing unjust enrichment as a basis for its 
decision. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE RESPONDENT 
DAMAGES IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY PROOF OF DIRECT AND 
PROXIMATE DAMAGES. 
The Respondent admitted that the Ten State Area 
Advertising Association, Inc. was a separate entity over 
which it had no control. (T. 436). It admitted that this 
advertising cooperative was not even contemplated in 1977 
when the Franchise Agreement was signed. (T. 436). Upon 
cross-examination, the President of the Respondent, Ed 
Craig, admitted that it had not been damaged due to the 
Appellant's failure to join the advertising co-op and that 
the damages sought under the Respondent's Complaint (R. 
1), were sums allegedly due the Ten State Area Advertising 
Association, Inc. (T. 449). 
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The Appellant contends that the Respondent failed to 
prove $1.00 in damages. There is no testimony or any 
exhibits which show the Respondent suffered any loss. The 
lower Court found that the Appellant had to contribute 2% 
of its gross profits to the Trust but then awarded over 
$4,000.00 to the Respondent. The Trust was not a party to 
these proceedings; and, even if it were, the Trust could 
not have shown the Appellant breached any agreements with 
it. There are none. Indeed, the trial court did not even 
order the Respondent to pay over the alleged damages to 
the Trust. 
The Appellant believes the Lower Court ignored the 
rules set forth in Turtle Management Inc. v. Haggis 
Management, 645 P.2d. 667 (Utah 1982). In Turtle, the 
Court established a tripartite test in establishing 
damages. First, has a legal right of the complainant been 
invaded? Second, is there a causal connection between the 
legal wrong suffered and the damages claimed? Third, is 
there sufficient certainty so that speculation is avoided. 
Id. at 670. In the case at hand, there is no connection 
between the Trust and the Respondent. How can the 
Respondent pocket the fees allegedly due the advertising 
trust? 
In conclusion the Appellant submits that the 
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reasoning, if any, which justifies any view in the 
Respondent's favor, disintegrates at this level. On the 
one hand, there is no nexus or agreement between the Trust 
and the Appellant at all. On the other hand the Lower 
Court awarded the Respondent damages due the Trust. 
However, there is no nexus or contract between the 
Respondent and the Trust and the latter isn't even a party 
to these proceedings. 
The Appellant earnestly believes an error occurred at 
the bench below. No damages to the Respondent were 
proved and none should be awarded. 
POINT V 
ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED THE APPELLANT IF HE 
SUCCEEDS ON APPEAL AS THE "PREVAILING PARTY" 
Assuming that the Appellant is successful on appeal, 
the Appellant should be awarded attorney's fees as the 
"prevailing party." Paragraph 32 of the Franchise 
Agreement calls for attorney's fees: 
"32. Litigation Expense. In the event that an 
action at law or suit in equity is brought to 
establish, obtain or enforce any right by either of 
the parties to this agreement, the prevailing party 
in such suit or action, both in the trial and 
appellate courts, shall be entitled to a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be recovered from the other party 
as well as that party's costs and disbursements 
incurred in such suit or action." 
The Appellant respectfully requests this Court to 
remand for purposes of awarding attorney's fees to the 
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Appellant if it is successful on appeal. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Appellant avers that Section 18 of the Franchise 
Agreement is clear and unambiguous. There is no 
requirement for the Appellant to join the Ten State Area 
Advertising Association Inc. There is no language which 
even suggests the Appellant is obligated to pay 2% of his 
gross profits to the separate entity. The Trial Court 
erred in its construction of Section 18, erred in 
admitting parol and extrinsic evidence to construe Section 
18, and erred in awarding damages allegedly due the 
advertising trust to the Respondent. 
The Appellant seeks a reversal of the Trial Court's 
Judgment regarding the Appellant's obligation to join the 
Trust, regarding the Appellant's obligation to pay 2% of 
his gross profits to the Trust, and regarding the damages 
found due. The Appellant seeks further a remand for the 
purposes of assessing attorney's fees as the prevailing 
party. 
DATED this ft day of July, 1986. 
M>$^ . 
STEPHEN WT"C00K7 
Attorney for Appellant 
COOK & WILDE, P.C. 
6925 Union Park Center 
Suite 490 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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David J. Knowlton, Esq., 2910 Washington Blvd., #305, 
Ogden, Utah, 84402, this {0 day of July, 1986. 
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"HOMETOWN TACO TIME" 
Franchise Agreement 
Green River, Utah 
location 
THIS AGREEMENT made by and between CRAIG FOOD 
INDUSTRIES, INC.
 # . a Delaware corporation, hereinafter designated 
as CFtt and George H. Weihing 
« — • 
sinafter designated as the Operator, WITNESSETH: 
RECITALS 
A. TACO TIME INTERNATIONAL, INC., an Oregon 
corporation, (The Company) has over a period of time and at con-
siderable expense developed and established a uxiiform and unique 
method of operation, customer serv ice , advertising, publicity, pro* 
c e s s e s , techniques and technical knowledge in connection with the 
restaurant business, the outlets for which are known as and named 
nTACO TIME. ,f The Company has caused the trademark MTACO TIME11 
to be registered with the United States Patent Office and the Canadian 
Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs. In addition, The 
Company has obtained other registrations to enhance and protect the 
"TACO TIMEM image. 
B. The developments of The Company as recited above 
are o&considerable value. The Operator recognizes that it is of 
importance to The Company and all of its other Operators to maintain 
the development of The Company's methods in a uniform and distinctive 
manner, thereby allowing the Operator and all other Operators of The 
Company to enjoy a public image and reputation greatly in excess df 
that which any single Operator could establ ish. 
C. The Company has heretofore designatedCFI as its 
area l icensor in the area covered by this agreement. This agreement 
i s , therefore, between CFI and the Operator. However, neither this 
agreement nor any of the rights or duties of the parties hereto shall 
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have jiny fcrce or effect until this agreement ia approved hereon by 
The Company, which approval is a conditipn precedent to thia 
agreement . 
D. The Operator des ires to establ ish a f,TACO TIME" 
resiauj-an* and CFI is willing to grant the Operator the right to do 
s o under the terma% conditions and proviaiona hereinafter set forth* 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises , thta 
mutual prornisea of the parties herein exchanged and other good and 
valuable consideration, the parties agree as followa: 
1. Franchise, C F I ^ e r c ^ y granta, se l l s and conveys to 
the Operator the exclusive right to utilize the above -mentioned method* 
and s y s t e m , together with the use of av<ulable Company trademarks, 
Tradenames, techniques, advertising, proces sea , recipes , and deaigHs 
at the following location: 
State . Utah 
County - Eaery 
City • Green River 
Address - 75 West Third Avenue 
The Operator shall have the exclusive right at the above address to 
es tabl i sh one "TACo TIME*' restaurant and CFI will not establish or 
ca.use to be franchised another "TACO TIMEM restaurant within the 
a: ea described in exhibit f,Af' hereto attached, without first ob -
taining the written Consent of the Operator. 
2« Consideration, In consideration of the grlnt of thia 
right to the Operator, the Operator agrees to pay to CFI the sum of 
5 LQ,000.00 A deposit of S 5-,000.00 t together with thia 
agreement executed by the Operator shall be submitted forthwith by 
the Operator toCFL. The Operator will pay the balance of the franchiaa 
/tftf to CFI wi&ia to& (20) dzys &/ter receipt by the Operator of this *gre*< 
ment duly approved by The Company. If The Company doea not accept 
this agreement within thirty (30) days after the receipt thereof by The 
Company, the deposit above mentioned shall be refunded by CFI to the 
Operator. If The Company docs approve thia agreement and the 
Operator should fail to pay the balance of the franchise fee within ten 
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(10) days after receipt of this agreement duly approved by The 
Company, the deposit shall be forfeited as liquidated damages and 
-this agreement shall be of no further binding force or effect. 
3 . Term. The term of this franchise agreement and 
the period within which the Operator shall have the rights and privi-
l eges hereby granted to him shall commence as of the date hereof and 
shall terminate fifteen (15) years thereafter; except that the term shall 
be automatically renewed for an additional fifteen (15) years unleaa 
either party gives the other written notice to the contrary not l e s s 
than thirty (30) days prior to the expiration of the first fifteen-year 
period. 
4. Construction. Within ninety(90) days after the date 
hereof, the Operator will erect or cause to be erected a "TACO TIME , , 
restaurant at the above-mentioned address. Prior to the commence-
ment of any construction thereof or the entering into of any contract 
for such construction, the Operator will submit to CFI the detailed 
plans and specifications of the restaurant and related improvements, 
all of which must be approved by CFI before construction is com-
menced or a contract for construction is made. The Operator shall 
not enter into any lease or contractual arrangement covering the 
address specified above, nor any construction contract without first 
submitting the same to CFI for approval. It is agreed that it i s not 
the obligation of CFI to select a location for the Operator or to obtain 
a l ease or otherwise acquire such premises for the Operator. 
5. Manual. CFI will furnish to the Operator a copy of 
the "TACO TIME Operator's Manual,: (hereinafter referred to as the 
Manual) which has been prepared by The Company. The Operator 
will at all t imes comply with the procedures, recipes and provisions 
set forth in the Manual. The Manual is incorporated in this agreement 
to the same extent as if set fQfth in full herein. The Company T*B*TV*B 
the right from time to time to make changes and additions to the Manual 
in light of experience in order to better promote the continued s u c c e s s -
ful operation of "TACO TIME" restaurants. All such changes in the 
Manual shall uniformly apply to all Operators. 
6. Equipment. The Company has developed certain 
special ized equipment for utilization in connection with the operation 
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of "TACO TIME" restaurants. Such equipment must be acquired by the 
Operator prior to the completion of construction of the Operator's 
"TACO TIME11 restaurant. Such equipment must at all times meet 
a l l of the standards and specifications of The Company. Other equipment 
to be uti l ized by the Operator in connection with the "TACO TIME" 
restaurant must be approved by The Company and by CFI. The Operator 
w i l l purchase, lease or otherwise acquire signs for advertising and 
identifying the Operator's location as a TACO TIME restaurant. The 
des ign of such signs shall be in accordance with those set forth in the 
Manual. 
7. Training, CFI w i U train the Operator and one employee 
of the Operator for a period of up to three weeks at such location or 
locations as may be designated by CFL This training shall be pro -
vided without additional expense to the Operator, with the exception 
that the Operator shall pay the travel and living expenses of the Operator 
and the employee of the Operator during such training sess ion . The 
areas of training shall include customer relations, management, food 
preparation, operation, control sys tems , training of personnel, ad-
ver t i s ing , promotion, maintenance and sanitation. A continuing training 
program will be provided to the Operator by CFI through the medium of 
bul let ins , manuals, and other literature. It i s understood that the 
training herein mentioned is mandatory and must be availed of by the 
Operator and one of the Operator's employees . 
8. Opening Assistance. Pr ior to the opening of the 
Operator !s "TACO TIMZM restaurant, a representative of CFI wil l 
be present to ass i s t the Operator in the select ion of employees and 
their training. This representative will a lso ass i s t the Operator in 
establishing local procedures and generally a s s i s t in the opening of 
the restaurant. 
9. Standards. During the term of this agreement, the 
Operator will operate a sanitary, efficient, and high quality restaurant, 
and so conduct and maintain the restaurant and premises as to not d i s -
tract from or interfere with the integrity and high standards of The 
Company. The Operator shall at all t imes comply with the terms of 
this agreement, the Manual, and all applicable laws, ru les , ordinances 
and regulations of governmental authorities pertaining to the operation 
of the Operator1 a restaurant. 
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10. Inspection, Either CFI or The Company, or their 
respect ive representatives or designees, shall have iree access to the 
premises of the Ooerator at all times for the purpose of inspecting and 
examining the same. At the time of such examinations and inspections 
by CFI# it or its representative or designee shall render advice and 
ass is tance to the Operator in the management and conduct of the restaurant. 
At all times either CFI °* Tbe Company, or their respective representative 
or designee, shall have access to the books and records of the Operator 
and may audit the same if, in the sole discretion of either CFI or The 
Company, or their respective representatives or designees, such an 
audit is deemed necessary. CFI or its representative or designee, 
wil l make at lease six (6) inspections during each twelve (12) month 
period. CFI shall not be responsible for a breach hereof until The 
Company and CFI have received thirty (30) days1 written notice from the 
Operator specifying the nature of the breach. If during such thirty (30) 
day period either CFI or The Company, or their respective representatives 
or designees, makes an inspection, the breach shall be cured. 
11. Operating Charge. The Operator shall pay toCFI a 
sum equal to three and one-half percent ( 3 | %) of the gross receipts 
of the Operator resulting from the conduct of the Operator's business 
from the address mentioned above. 
The Operator shall furnish to CFI not 
later than the 10th day of each calendar month a detailed profit and loss 
statement prepared upon forms approved or furnished by CFI t a n d shall 
at the time of the giving of such profit and loss statement pay to CFI the 
percentage mentioned above. In addition, CFI may require the Operator 
to furnish to CFI each week a statement of(£ross receipt^and (yageq) 
paid on a form approved or provided by CFI. 
*2« Supplies. The Operator will use only such supplies 
and ingredients as comply with the standards as set forth in the Manual, 
The Operator shall purchase from The Company all of the Operator's 
requirements of the following ingredients: 
TACO TIME Meat Spice Mix 
TACO TIME Hot Sauce Spice Mix 
TACO TIME Hot Sauce Vegetable Mix 
It i s understood that the foregoing ingredients are essential to the 
uniformity and quality of the products of ,fTACO TIME11 restaurants, 
are premixed, and the recipes therefore and ingredients thereon are 
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t r a d e s e c r e t s . The Operator will make payment to The Company 
for a l l pu rchase s from it in cash upon de l ive ry at the O p e r a t o r ' s p lace 
of b u s i n e s s . These-ingredients shu.Il r.ot be removed from the p r e -
m i s e s desc r ibed in paragraph 1 hereof and shal l not be reso ld or u sed 
i n any m a n n e r other than as an ingredient in menu i t e m s . 
13. Assignment. CFIis en te r ing into this ag reemen t and 
The Company has approved the same based upon i ts knowledge and faith 
in the abil i ty and background of the Ope ra to r . T h e r e f o r e , this a g r e e -
m e n t i s pe r sona l to the Operator and may not be ass igned by the O p e r a t o r 
wi thout f i r s t having received the wri t ten consent of CFI and The Company, 
Any a t t empt at assignment hereof shal l be absolutely null and void and 
s h a l l give to CFI the right to cancel this ag reemen t , in addition to any 
r e m e d i e s which CFI may have for the b r e a c h of this covenant by r e a s o n 
of such at tempted ass ignment . 
14. Sale of Bus iness . In the event the Opera tor r e ce ive s 
a bona fide offer to purchase his bus iness , CFI shall have a sixty (60) 
day f i r s t re fusa l option to purchase the bus iness at the p r i ce and upon 
the t e r m s specified in such offor. If CFE does not exe rc i se i ts option, 
C F I and The Company will consent to the sa le thereof to any re spons ib le 
b u y e r who m e e t s The Company fs then qualifications of an Opera tor p r o -
v ided : 
(a) The purchase r has a sa t i s fac tory c red i t ra t ing and i s 
of good m o r a l c h a r a c t e r ; 
(b) The purchase r is willing to take CFI t ra in ing to such 
extent as CFI in its sole d i sc re t ion , deems n e c e s s a r y 
or des i rab le , and pays to CFI the sum of One Thousand 
Dollars ($1,000) for such t ra in ing; 
(c) Shall enter into all ag reemen t s that The Company is a t 
that time requir ing of new O p e r a t o r s ; and 
(d) All obligations of the Opera tor he reunder a r e fully paid 
and satisfied, and the Opera tor is not in default under 
any of the provisions of this ag reemen t . 
15. Confidential Information. The Opera tor acknowledges 
t h a t m u c h of the information impar ted to the Operator by CFI and The 
Company in the Opera tor ' s bus iness is confidential and shal l r e m a i n 
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the so le and exclusive proper ty of The Company. During the t e rm 
of th i s agreement and for a period of five (5) y e a r s thereaf ter , the 
Ope ra to r will not disclose any information rece ived by the Operator 
f rom CFI or The Company or from their r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , except as 
m a y be n e c e s s a r y to successfully opera te the he re in franchised bus i -
n e s s of the Operator . All m a t e r i a l s such as m a n u a l s , r ec ipes , menus , 
b r o c h u r e s and the like shall r emain the p rope r ty of The Company and 
sha l l be re turned to The Company by the Opera tor upon the termination 
of th is agreement for any r eason . Whenever reques ted by CFI the 
Ope ra to r will obtain commitments in wr i t ing upon forms approved by 
C F I from employees of the Operator who, by v i r tue of such employ-
m e n t , may obtain information concerning the confidential information 
ment ioned here in , binding such employees not to d i sc lose the s ame , 
except as may be authorized in such a g r e e m e n t . 
16. Indemnity. Operator will indemnify and save Tte 
Company and CFI h a r m l e s s from and aga ins t a l l f ines, su i t s , p r o -
ceed ings , c la ims , causes of action, demands or l iabi l i t ies of any 
kind o r of any nature ar is ing out of or in connection with the con-
s t ruc t ion or operation of the Opera to r ' s ! lTACO TIME" res tauran t . 
The Opera tor shall at all t imes keep in force public liability insurance 
i n su r ing CFI. The Company, and the Ope ra to r , with l imi ts as may be 
f rom t ime to time prescr ibed by The Company, but not less than One 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000) for bodily injury to one person, 
T h r e e Hundred Thousand Dollars ($300, 000) for bodily injury in one 
acc iden t , and Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) for proper ty damage. 
Such insurance shall express ly cover products l iabil i ty, with the l imi ts 
for bodily injury as set forth above. Copies of such policy or policies 
and proof of payment of p r emiums , together with proof of renewals 
thereof , will be promptly furnished to The Company and to CFI. All 
such pol ic ies shall contain provis ions to the effect that the same can be 
cance l led only after not l e ss than ten (10) days 1 wr i t t en notice to The 
Company and to CFL 
17. Independent Cont rac tor . The re la t ionship between 
C F I , The Company, and the Operator i s that of independent cont rac tors 
and Opera to r is in no way to be deemed a p a r t n e r , joint ven ture r , agent 
o r s e r v a n t of ei ther CFI or of The Company. The Operator shall not 
have authori ty to bind ei ther The Company o r CFI to any contractual 
obl igat ion or incur any liability for o r on behalf of The Company or CFL 
18. Advertising. At a l l t imes the Opera tor will conduct 
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the business which is the subject of this franchise under the name 
"TACO TIME" and will advertise his "TACO TIME" restaurant and 
i ts serv ices on a scale consistent with the volume of his business and 
in keeping with practical business pract ices . In so advertising, the 
Operator will utilize all advertising formats, formulas, and programs 
furnished to the Operator by CFI. It is understood that CFI may de -
s i re to cause Operatois in a given area to join into a uniform program "\ 
of promoting given pfoHucts or serv ices either through sales , discounts, s 
specials or other promotional devices . The Operator will participate J 
in any such procedures upon the request of CFI# 
19. Hours of Operation, The Operator will keep his flTACO 
TIME11 restaurant open for business to the public and lighted and staffed 
during such hours as CFI may from time to time designate in writing, 
but not less than eight (8) hours a day each day of the year, except 
Sundays and holidays, 
20. Termination. Should the Operator in any maimer d e -
fault in or breach any of the terms or provisions herein contained and 
fail to rectify such after thirty (30) days1 written notice thereof from 
either CFI or The Company to the Operator, either The Company or 
CFI shall have the right and option at any time thereafter to terminate 
this agreement. Upon such termination, the Operator will return to CFI 
all rec ipes , manuals, menus, brochures and other information delivered 
to the Operator theretofore by The Company or by CFI and shall forth-
with cease utilizing the name "TACO TIME11 in connection with the opera-
tion of his business. All design, insignia and other material relating to 
the unique system developed by The Company shall not be thereafter 
utilized by the Operator in connection with his business or any other 
business . In the event the Operator should fail to cease the use of any 
of the items herein mentioned, The Company or CFI may enter the 
Operator's premises without being guilty of trespass or any other tort 
and remove and retain the ^sarne. Any expense incurred by The Company 
or by CFI in removing any such s igns , insignia or other material from 
the Operator's premises shall be paid to The Company or to CFI by the 
Operator upon demand, together with interest upon such expenses at 
the highest lawful rate from the date of expenditure until paid. The 
Company and CFI shall have any other remedy for a breach hereof ava i l -
able at law or in equity. 
21. Corporate Entity. Should the Operator be a corporation, 
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t h e r e shal l be no change m the p resen t ownership of the stock of the 
Ope ra to r without the prior writ ten coasn.. t of The Company and of CFI . 
In the event any such ch? ^ e m ownership is other than for the purpose 
of a bona fide sale 01 such stock to an unre la ted tl.ird par ty, such con-
sen t sha l l not be unreasonably withheld by The Company or byCFL In 
the event the contemplated change in ownership is the resu l t of an in -
tended bona fide sale to an unrelated th i rd par ty , the provisions of 
p a r a g r a p h 13 hereof shall apply. Change in ownership shall be deemed 
to include the t ransfer of otock now i s sued and o\:tstanding and the 
i s s u a n c e of new stock, whether the s a m e consti tutes t r easu ry stock or 
o t h e r w i s e . The Operator agrees that the re shal l be placed on the face 
of each of its stock certif icates a r e f e rence to the res t r ic t ions on t r a n s -
fer contained here in . The Operator m a y not use the words "TACO TIME" 
in i t s corpora te name ar.d shall not make any puh?ic offering of its s tock 
o r o ther secur i t ies wirnout f i rs t rece iv ing the wri t ten consent of The 
Company and of CFI. 
22. Use of ?.fa:ne. If applicable local law requi res the 
Ope ra to r to file or recorc the name f ,TACO TIME" or amy name con-
taining those words to enable the Opera tor to conduct the franchised 
out le t utilizing that name, The Company ana CFI will, if necessa ry , 
execute appropriate consents the re to . No such consent shal l be con-
strued as a relinquishment 01 The Company's exclusive ownership in 
the name MTACO 7IMZ, ' bv*i ^hail be given only to pe rmi t the Operator 
to comply with applicable local law regard ing the use of assumed or 
f ict i t ious business names . The Opera tor wili , whenever requested by 
The Company, consent to me filing or record ing by The Company or by 
o the r f ranchisees or l icensees of The Company or of CFI ox the name 
"TACO TIME, ! so as to enable operat ion of other r e s t au ran t s using the 
n a m e MTACO TIME'1 so long as no snch other r e s t au ran t is located within 
the geographical a rea set forth in pa rag raph 1 hereof. Upon the exp i r a -
t ion of the t e rm of this agreement , upon the expiration of any renewal 
t e r m hereof, and upon the terminat ion or cancellation of this ag reement 
for any cause , the Operator will, upon The Company's r eques t , exe -
cute and cause to be properly filed and r eco rded any and all documents 
n e c e s s a r y or des i rable to effect the cancel lat ion and terminat ion by 
the Opera tor of any filing or recording by the Operator of any document 
containing the words 'TACO TIME11. 
23 . Lease Assignment. Upon the terminat ion of this 
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a g r e e m e n t for any reason , the Opera tor wil l assign to CFI on demand 
the l e a s e , if any, covering the p r e m i s e s from and upon which the 
Ope ra to r has operated the MTACO TIME" re s t au ran t which is the s u b -
j e c t hereof . 
24. Remedies . It is agreed that should the Operator 
b r e a c h any of the t e rms or provis ions of this agreement (other than 
those call ing for the payment of money only), CFI may enforce the 
s a m e by injunction, specific pe r fo rmance or other s imi la r remedy. 
However , such remedies a r e not exclusive and CFI may utilize any 
o the r r e m e d y available to i t . 
25. T rademarks and Trade N a m e s . The Operator 
acknowledges The Company's ownership of and rights to The Company's 
c u r r e n t and future t r a d e m a r k s , t r ade n a m e s , t rade s e c r e t s , and to a l l 
p r a c t i c e s , p rocedures , me thods , d e v i c e s , manua l s , slogans, and 
o the r m a t e r i a l constituting an e lement of the MTACO TIME11 sys tem. 
The Opera tor will not contest at any t ime during or after the term of 
this agreement , in any manne r , the val idi ty of The Company's ex-
c lus ive ownership of and r ights to any of the above-mentioned i t e m s , 
whe the r now existing or he rea f te r c rea ted or obtained. The Operator 
sha l l immediately refer to The Company any infringement of or 
chal lenge to the validity or ownership of the name "TACO TIME" any 
de r iva t ive name, or The Company's t r a d e m a r k s , trade names or copy-
r i g h t s , together with any unfair competi t ion which interferes with the 
re la t ionsh ip of the par t ies here to or the re la t ionship between The 
Company and other f ranchisees . Such notification shall contain all 
de ta i l s concerning such infr ingements or unfair competition that a r e 
avai lable to the Operator . The Company shal l have complete control 
over the s a m e . The Operator will coopera te with The Company to the 
extent n e c e s s a r y in connection with any such infringement, unfair c o m -
pet i t ion or litigation. 
26. Pape r and Related P r o d u c t s . To insure the proper and 
effective use of The Company's t r a d e m a r k s , copyrights , t rade names 
smd s y s t e m s , the Operator will use paper and rela ted products bear ing 
the t r a d e names , copyrights or t r a d e m a r k s of the Company to the extent 
and in the manner specified from t ime to t ime by The Company. 
27. Nature of Liabili ty. In the event the Operator cons is t s 
of two or m o r e pe r sons , such pe r sons sha l l be jointly and severa l ly 
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l iable under the provisions oi this agreement. 
28. Illegality. This agreement is a general form in-
tended for use throughout the United States and in the event any of 
the t e r m s , covenants or provisions herein contained violate or 
contravene the laws of any state or territory, such provisions shall 
be deemed not a part of this agreement, and the remainder of this 
agreement shall remain in full force and effect. 
29. Notices. All notices herein specified shall be in 
writing and sent by certified mail with return receipt requested to 
The Company at 3880 West 11th A v e . , P. O. Box 2056, Eugene, Oregon, 
97402, to CFI at 3745 So. 250 W. , P.O. Box 9255, Ogden, Utah, 84409, or 
as The Company or CFI* as the case maybe , may designate in writing, 
and to the Operator at the address of the "TACO TIME11 restaurant 
to be established by him as above set forth, 
30. Interpretation. All of the covenants, agreements, 
conditions and terms contained in this contract shall be binding upon, 
apply and inure to the benefit of the successors and assign* of the r e -
spective parties hereto. Nothing in this paragraph shall, however, 
be construed as a consent by The Company or by CFI to the assignment 
of this agreement by the Operator. 
31* Waiver. Failure of CFI t o insist upon the strict per -
formance of any term, covenant, or condition in this agreement 
contained shall not constitute or be construed as a waiver or re -
linquishment of the right of CFI to thereafter enforce any such term, 
covenant or condition and the same shall continue in full force and 
effect. 
32. Litigation Expense. In the event that an action at law 
or suit in equity is brought "to establish, obtain or enforce any right 
by either of the parties to this agreement, the prevailing party in such 
suit or action, both in the trial and appellate courts, shall be entitled 
to a reasonable attorney's fee to be recovered from the other party as 
wel l as that party fs costs and disbursements incurred in such suit or 
action* 
33. Applicable Law. The law of the State of Utah shall 
govern all of the rights and duties of the parties under the provisions 
of this agreement. 
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34, Area License, CFI has entered Into this agreement 
as the area licensor of The Company* If for any reason the relation-
ship between The Company and CFI is terminated or otherwise ceases 
and The Company notifies the Operator thereof in writing, then this 
agreement shall be deemed to be between the Operator and The Company 
only and The Company shall have all of the rights and duties of CFI here* 
under from and after the giving of such notice, including but not l imited 
to the right to receive any and all moneys then or thereafter owing h e r e -
under by the Operator to CFI. The Operator shall rely upon such written 
not ic* and shall be under no obligation to make inquiry or to investigate 
the validity or existence of such termination or cessation* The Company 
does indemnify and hold the Operator harmles s from and against any 
l iabi l i ty or damages as a result of the Operator's recognition of and 
adherence to the provisions of this paragraph, -vs^ fe*.' 
*X-a^r 
35. Entire Agreement. This agreement constitutes the 
ent ire agreement of the parties (into which all prior negotiations, 
commitments , representations, and undertakings with respect to the 
subject matter hereof are merged) and there are no oral or other 
writ ten understandings or agreements between the parties hereto re* 
lating to the subject matter hereof. 
DATED this 4th day of *&y
 t 19 77 . 
CRAIG FOOD INDUSTRIES, INC, 
OPERATOR 
APPROVED this J. day of 
__ QS, Ceorge-Tu W«£hing 
TACO TIME INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
Its President 
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EXHIBIT "A" TO FRANCHISE AGREEMENT 
between CRAIG FOOD INDUSTRIES, INC, and 
George H. Welhlna .
 m^m 
"operator11 
as referred to in paragraph 1 of such franchise agreement (page 3^# 
AREA DESCRIPTION: Th« protected franchise area granted to 
Greexl River Taco Tlae at the addresa In this franchise 
agreement wi l l be a f ive mile radius from said address. 
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